Climate change has been at the core of the European Union's (EU) environmental policy since 1988 and has been integral to its pursuit of international leadership to foster multilateral climate protection. Both the EU and the international community highlighted climate change as a major security issue in 2007. This article examines the arguments that underpinned that policy turn and explores their implications for the Union and for international efforts to address the challenge of climate change. More specifically, this analysis assesses what it has meant for the EU to define climate change as a security issue. It asks whether this shift represents a deepening of the projection of the EU as civilian power and of its commitment to effective multilateralism and peace-building or a 'securitisation' of climate change policy and of the international leadership role sought by the EU. The article concludes by positing three alternative scenarios that suggest different ways in which the role of the EU and its linking of climate change and security may evolve in coming years.
Several years earlier, a report commissioned by the Pentagon entitled, 'An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and its implications for US National Security' (Schwartz & Randall, 2003) , had suggested defence actors might have interest in the topic, but it did not lead to their substantive engagement. The CNA report signalled a turn toward more direct and visible US military involvement in the debate.
2007 also saw NATO show interest in climate change. Its Parliamentary Assembly devoted a session to 'Climate change: Thinking beyond Kyoto,' with Canadian MP Nolin as rapporteur (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2007) and NATO Review published an issue entitled, 'Growing dangers: emerging and developing security threats' in which articles by IPCC Chairman Pachauri and European Research Commissioner Potočnick focused on climate change (NATO Review, 2007) .
In the EU context, in March 2007 the European Council established new ambitious targets of 20/20 by 2020 (20% emissions reduction, 20% share of renewable energy in total energy consumption by 2020) and in June 2007 it invited the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Commission to present a joint report on climate change and security. Also in June, the Commission published the Green Paper 'Adapting to climate change in Europe' (European Commission, 2007) , which called for the integration of adaptation perspectives into EU efforts concerning the prevention of conflicts arising from access to natural resources that could be aggravated by climate change. While emissions reduction and mitigation policies remained central foci in this analysis, it also emphasized the issue of adaptation to the inevitable impacts of climate change more strongly than EU publications had in the past.
A Nobel Prize for Peace crowned 2007 as the year of climate change as a peace and security issue. In October 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and former US Vice-President Al Gore were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. The Nobel Committee noted: "By awarding the Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 to the IPCC and Al Gore, the Norwegian Nobel Committee is seeking to contribute to a sharper focus on the processes and decisions that appear to be necessary to protect the world's future climate, and thereby to reduce the threat to the security of mankind." (www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/). One may also well imagine that Oslo was looking towards Copenhagen and the Conference of the Parties to the FCCC of 2009, and considered that a focus on climate change as a peace and security issue could help prompt appropriate decisions and action.
The EU High Representative and the European Commission presented the joint document 'Climate change and international security' to the European Council on 14 March 2008 (European Union, 2008 . The document defined climate change as a 'threat multiplier' and pointed to threats linked to climate change and related to conflicts over natural resources such as degradation of fresh water supplies, damages to coastal cities and critical infrastructure, tensions related to energy, loss of land, border disputes and migration due to environmental degradation, situations of fragility and radicalisation, pressures in international governance.
In June 2008 the US National Intelligence Council presented to the House of Representatives its report, National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030. The report examined such implications for the US and also for China, Russia, North Africa, Mexico and the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Island states (NIC, 2008) .
The 2008 British national security strategy also included a discussion of the implications of climate change (UK Cabinet Office, 2008) . The issue also received attention in a national security document presented by German Chancellor Angela Merkel that same year (CDU/CSU-Bundesfraktion, 2008).
The EU addressed climate change as a specific threat in its Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2008. That analysis endorsed the definition of climate change as a 'threat multiplier' and argued, 'We have enhanced our conflict prevention and crisis management, but need to improve analysis and early warning capabilities' and 'International co-operation, with the UN and regional organisations, will be essential' (Council of the EU, 2008).
A September 2009 report of the UN Secretary General on Climate change and its possible security implications identified both 'threat multipliers' and 'threat minimizers' and considered an effective deal in Copenhagen a most effective 'threat minimiser' as it would 'help stabilise our climate, protect development gains, assist vulnerable nations adapting to climate change, and build a more secure, sustainable and equitable society' (UN General Assembly, 2009, p. 2).
On 7 December 2009, the opening date of the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP) to the FCCC, 56 newspapers from 45 countries took the unprecedented step of speaking with one voice through a common editorial entitled, "Fourteen days to seal history's judgement on this generation' and wrote: "We do so because humanity faces a profound emergency. Unless we combine to take decisive action, climate change will ravage www.ccsenet.org/res Review of European Studies Vol. 5, No. 3; 2013 our planet, and with it our prosperity and security" (The Guardian et al., 2009) . At the Conference itself, security aspects of climate change were addressed in some side events (e.g., by the Institute of Environmental Security), but the Copenhagen Accord did not reference security.
Eventually, the Copenhagen Accord was formulated, that left many observers and the EU disappointed by the lack of mandatory commitments to the renewal of the Kyoto Protocol. The process leading to the Accord also indicated a stronger role of China and other emerging economies in the negotiations and a no longer hostile US Administration, with President Obama acknowledging the importance of an agreement but not ready to support binding commitments. Following laborious negotiations at the following COPs, the Doha Conference of December 2012 reached an agreement to extend the life of the Kyoto Protocol, due to expire at the end of 2012, until 2020, and to foster the implementation of the Durban Platform agreed at the COP of 2011 and stipulating that a successor to the Protocol is to be developed by 2015 and implemented by 2020.
Evidence and Uncertainties
While the links between climate change and security have gained attention in recent years, they remain hard to grasp, both in terms of scientific evidence and of their policy implications.
Research on environmental security dates back to the 1980s and one of its primary general findings-that environmental variables alone are not sufficient to cause violent conflict and that other factors also need to be examined in tandem (Homer-Dixon, 1991) -has been corroborated by further studies (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Buhaug et al., 2010; Gleditsch et al., 2006) . Those analyses point to the need to assess the specific factors that determine the vulnerability or resilience of societies, institutions and economic sectors to climate change impacts and argue there is no linear and deterministic relation between, for example, water scarcity and war over the control of river basins. Indeed, several instances of cooperation have developed over time in this regard, including negotiated shared use of the Jordan, Nile and Mekong rivers. Nonetheless, climate change induced challenges to cooperation over water resources can become especially hard to handle in politically and economically unstable areas. Similarly, the relationships between desertification or floods and mass migration that could lead to violent reactions in recipient countries also need to be examined carefully. The character and likely size of migration populations need to be assessed in light of the fact that the most deprived people often cannot afford migration as an option and try to adapt where they are. Hopefully, one of the first cases of migration directly caused by sea level rise linked to climate change ,from Tuvalu atoll island to New Zealand, was handled cooperatively (through the Pacific Access Category immigration deal between the governments of Tuvalu, Fiji, Kiribati, Tonga and New Zealand). On the other hand, migration-related xenophobic violence is present in many areas with no link to climate. Thus, one can expect this to intensify if migration flows will increase in such areas.
Given the complexity and sensitivity of the issues, the 2007 IPCC report could not offer definitive evidence on the specific features and implications of climate change as a possible multiplier of tensions and conflicts over vital natural resources (water, land, food, energy) or its relationship to the origins of disasters (floods, cyclones, desertification and sea level rise). The EU has increased its research capacity to investigate such matters with a cluster of three research projects dedicated to the links between climate change, water and security in the Mediterranean region (CLIWASEC -http://www.cliwasec.eu/home/home.php; Ludwig et al., 2011) The scientific uncertainties surrounding the specific factors that make climate change a threat to security suggest that such factors need to be assessed carefully to avoid unsound responses, including a shift from reasoned concern to a focus on fears that could be manipulated for other objectives than combatting climate change. Tackling such uncertainties is an explicit aim of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report due in 2014, where the Working Group on Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability includes work on water security and on food security as well as a dedicated chapter on Human Security (IPCC, 2012: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ar5/ar5-outline-compilation.pdf). This indicates a stronger scientific focus on the links between climate change and security, with a framing that highlights security in relation to specific natural resources and to the broader human security concept.
Security Paradigms
The contemporary discussion concerning the possible security implications of climate change is developing along three distinct lines of argumentation: one that considers that the only way to make climate change a salient political issue is to define it as a national security concern (see, for example, Busby, 2008; Mabey, 2008) . Another group of analysts see it as a clear case of human security given its global scope and environmental, Whatever their perspectival differences, key policy documents linking climate and security, whether labelled 'human security', 'collective security', 'international security', 'global security' or 'comprehensive security', have in common a broader and more interdependent approach than the national security paradigm.. Charting the relationships between the military and civilian sectors and their use in international policy-making is key to understanding how the different notions of security may be implemented. Notably, broader notions of security do not necessarily involve an exclusive reliance on civilian means.
Peace-keeping missions and 'humanitarian interventions' represent an explicit and direct link between civilian and military means, and their interpretation and implementation are objects of debate. In particular, Kennedy has argued that while cooperation in the planning and use of military and civil defence assets involves some efficiency gains, it also complicates humanitarian agencies' attempts to maintain neutrality, impartiality and independencefeatures that enable the creation of a humanitarian space in conflict zones (Kennedy, 2009) . NGOs active in the sector have expressed concerns about the shrinking of the humanitarian space in recent years (Hubert & Brassard-Boudreau, 2010) . Different degrees of cooperation between military and civilian actors have emerged over time ranging from the 'embedding' of humanitarian actors (as well as journalists) in military units, to the targeted protection of humanitarian operations by armed personnel as well as the deployment of military assets in disaster relief operations under civilian control. The issue such efforts raise is whether such cooperation is always necessary and even when deemed appropriate, practiced in a way that fully respects the different roles of humanitarian, other civilian and military actors involved in a conflict. 
Civilian Power: Variations on a Theme
According to the classic definition offered by François Duchêne, 'The European Community's interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces is as far as possible to domesticate relations between states (...). This means trying to bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics ' (Duchene, 1973) . This civilian power argument is at once empirical and normative. It is empirical in that European countries -with the exceptions of France and UK -are prominently civilian per default by not possessing nuclear weapons (a key element in the definition of a military power). It is normative in that it exhibits a preference for negotiated solutions to conflicts.
The many 'variations on a theme' of civilian power are well known and raise the following questions:  Can the EU be considered a 'power' at all?
 Is it a 'civilian power' by choice or necessity?
 Is civilian power a synonym for 'peaceful' and does it thereby exclude resort to military means?
 Is 'civilian' the same as 'civilising' others? If so, what are the implications of that assumption given the colonial past of several European countries?
All of these concerns raise questions about what 'civilian' means and how it ought to be operationalized.
While climate change was almost exclusively a civilian issue until the 2007 'turn', the issue's current connection with security raises the question of whether a change of actors or means to tackle it may be expected. To address that concern, it is first useful to summarise (as described above) the possible links between civilian and military power (as alternative approaches or, as is much more frequently the case in practise, contexts in which one dimension is more prominent than the other) and the three paradigms of human security, national security and comprehensive security briefly discussed above. The latter can be seen as endorsing the inter-national, collective and societal aspects of the human security paradigm while including the military option and a (partly) intelligence-based threat analysis of the national security paradigm. Thus it is can be considered as a 'variation' of the human security paradigm with the inclusion of aspects of the national security one. The EU approach to climate change has thus far sought strongly to join the application of civilian power to multilateralism (e.g. Telò, 2006).
Effective Multilateralism, Security and Climate Change
For a primarily civilian power, multilateralism is both a matter of choice and of necessity. From the point of view of necessity, one may hypothesize a positive correlation between civilian power and preference for multilateralism (if one cannot use force, s/he will use the economy, the law and/or diplomacy) and a negative correlation between military power and multilateralism (if one can impose its interests through force, s/he will not feel the need to negotiate, exercise persuasion and submit to common international rules). However, such a hypothesis is excessively simplistic. The concept of interdependence suggests full unilateralism is almost impossible to practice: even a hegemonic power needs some alliances, must participate to international fora (perhaps with a 'menu à la carte' approach) and/or justify -internally and externally -why, for example, a war is launched without Security Council approval or why the Kyoto Protocol does not merit assent. While for some nations multilateralism may be a necessity, it can also be a matter of choice based on a preference for binding international institutions and for norms that regulate the relationships between different countries and regions without resort to force, or with resort to violence only as 'ultima ratio' and then strictly regulated by international law. A civilian power can favour such a choice more than a military one, while not always pursuing it consistently. For example, some cases of bilateralism or protectionism can be pursued by both kinds of power and thereby partly undermine multilateral efforts. Vol. 5, No. 3; 2013 89 The EU climate change policy appears to represent a genuine case of multilateral choice: adherence to the UN institutional framework, commitment at the domestic/intra-EU level (while with frequent tensions) to put forward and to comply with international targets and norms; involvement -during the enlargement process -of future Member States to achieve their participation to the Kyoto Protocol; choice to favour the multilateral context even at the price of significant tensions with key international partners, including the USA, and difficult negotiations also with other industrialised and developing countries; and support to international institutions to mobilise knowledge (IPCC) and economic resources (Global Environmental Facility). At the same time, however, the non-participation of some key actors to the Kyoto Protocol and the continuing increase of GHG emissions has raised the issue of the effectiveness of such 'climate multilateralism'. Whether the change of approach embodied in the Copenhagen Accord will lead to a more effective multilateral framework cannot yet be judged. To date, the Accord has encouraged a variety of national and international commitments (different targets, baselines, nature of the pledges themselves) that make it more inclusive than the Kyoto Protocol, but more piecemeal and difficult to monitor and enforce.
The notion of effective multilateralism was prominent in the 2003 ESS:
In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective. We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. (…). We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken (Council of the EU, 2003, p. 9).
This stance implied a need for the EU to become more active, more capable and more coherent (EU, 2003, pp.11-13) . Some analysts noted both the central role reserved to the UN in the definition of effective multilateralism while others highlighted the different traditions of intervention among EU Member States that influence whether and how increased measures of activism and capacity -including civilian and military capacity-can be attained (Biscope & Drieskens, 2005) .
One may explore the implications of effective multilateralism by examining its success in securing stabilisation and reduction of GHG emissions and adaptation to climate change impacts. Concerning the stabilisation and reduction of GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol can be considered a case of legally effective, but incomplete multilateralism. That is, the agreement did establish an international legal framework with binding targets -but key players (namely the USA) did not sign. With regard to activism, capacity and coherence, the EU surely has been playing an active role in the UN on behalf of the Kyoto Protocol, and in so doing, has exercised a range of diplomatic and economic capacities. As the Union has sought these aims, its representatives have explicitly sought to align members' internal and external objectives. The effectiveness of these initiatives, however, has been limited as global GHG has continued to rise due to the absence of commitments by the largest contributors. This situation started shifting, at least in the US, with the growing perception of climate change as a security threat and the pressure of so important a sector as the military to act. Positive action is now also being advocated in several US states and by a group of Congress members favourable to GHG emission reductions. Together, these trends encouraged a prudent multilateral turn on climate change in the Obama Administration.
In China and India, -among the 'non-Annex 1 countries' under the Kyoto Protocol (that is the developing countries that were not requested to reduce GHG emissions)-, the perception of climate change as a threat to human security could facilitate a link between economic development and a commitment -compatible with such development-to address growing GHG emissions. While this was not particularly apparent in Copenhagen, the influence of such framing could increase in the future. In any case, surely, the means to reduce emissions will primarily arise from civilian action (that is, result from environmental, economic, energy and other policies) rather than military activities alone, The key existing institutional framework to attain such progress is the FCCC, in which all countries are involved.
The notion of 'threat multiplier' may bring more political attention and mobilisation of resources to the issue of climate change. While regional climate models are still the object of substantial criticism, it is already becoming clear that there may be 'winners' and 'losers' in different areas and sectors, at least in the shorter term. This raises the challenge of 'winners' not perceiving an obligation to address losses in the long-term. For example, the melting of ice in the Arctic Region represents an enormous risk for all countries vulnerable to sea level rise, in addition to a huge loss of ecosystems, but it can be seen by some nations as an opportunity to open navigable shipping routes and/or for petroleum or natural gas exploration or drilling. Sea-level rise may occasion tensions both as a result of people displaced from coastal areas due to sea level rise, and as a result of national supremacy www.ccsenet.org/res Vol. 5, No. 3; 2013 over new navigable routes and energy sources in an area until now under international protection. In this case again, most prudent response options are part of the civilian repertoire, including urban, energy and land use planning, immigration and other social policies. The military sector can assist with this issue by providing analytic assistance and early warning and in implementing relief operations to help populations coping with natural disasters. However, a too active engagement in tackling issues such as environmental displacement or migrations or controversies concerning the protection or exploitation of natural resources might actually work to worsen those problems. 
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Limited primarily to disaster relief operations, threat analysis
In short, the 'mean to ends' relation needs to be carefully assessed and, in such light, it can be concluded that effective multilateralism in the case of climate change remains strongly a civilian responsibility, while the involvement of the military sector beyond analysis and targeted relief operations could prove counterproductive.
EU Peace and Security Missions and Climate Change: From Neglect to Sensitivity?
As of December 2009 23 missions and operations had been conducted under the aegis of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP now the Common Security Defence Policy, CSDP) launched at the European Council of Cologne in 1999. A number of policy documents and independent studies have attempted to draw lessons from the first 10 years of ESDP/CSDP and many have offered interesting insights. Some studies have viewed the EU initiative positively and argued that it has helped resolve conflicts and build peace by deploying soldiers, police, judges and diplomats to crisis zones in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Africa and Asia (Grevi et a., 2009 ). Other analyses, meanwhile, have argued the CSDP record has been mixed -for both civil and military activities -with some cases judged successful (e.g. in Aceh & DR Congo) and others as failures (in Chad), and the majority seen as partially successful (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009 ). All analysts have converged, however, in pointing to several factors that have hampered ESDP missions. These have included a lack of resources, erratic political backing from EU member states, unclear or insufficiently flexible mission mandates and a generally insufficient focus on crisis prevention as compared to crisis management. This analysis contributes to this body of work by examining briefly what place climate change might occupy in future CSDP strategy and missions.
Past missions did not explicitly include climate change in either the assessments of the nature of the conflict(s) at stake, or in the design of the interventions undertaken. In two cases it can be argued climate change was 'on the radar screen' of some actors in the areas addressed by CSDP mission, namely in the case of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the Aceh Monitoring Mission. Nonetheless, neither mission explicitly tackled the concern, an outcome worth exploring.
The mandate of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission, which was initially motivated by the conflicts in Chad and Darfur, was then limited to protecting UN personnel and facilities in the area and did not explicitly consider of whether climate change was a relevant factor in the area. This stance occurred despite a UNEP report that had pointed to climate as a factor in the conflict and U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's statement in a commentary in the Washington Post in June 2007 that the violence in Darfur was partly induced by climate change, droughts and related fighting over water sources. The report and Secretary General's statement, widely publicised by the media, set off a high profile debate among governmental and non-governmental actors. Nonetheless, the EUFOR mandate did not include climate change concerns. This lacuna can possibly be attributed to the narrow scope of the mission, which did not reach the causes of violence in Darfur, nor address the question of whether some share of the region's refugees should be considered environmental migrants. Vol. 5, No. 3; 2013 The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was the first ESDP mission in Asia and was closely related to the Helsinki peace process that began in the province in January 2005, just a few weeks after the tsunami caused many victims and severe disruptions in the war-torn region. Whether the tsunami was linked to climate change has been a matter of protracted analysis and controversy, and this might explain why the concern was not explicitly addressed in the AMM. What the AMM addressed instead were the relationships between the post-tsunami reconstruction and peace processes, and between the Common Security mission staff and the many other actors (including the EU and its Member States) providing humanitarian aid in Aceh and Indonesia. The mission explicitly addressed those concerns and developed a multilateral and inter-regional framework of cooperation (with ASEAN) to address the needs of the province.
A lesson that might be drawn from the above is that while climate change has not been on the 'radar screen' of Union Common Security missions so far, its possible role as 'threat multiplier' could become an element in the design of the aims and modalities of future interventions. To incorporate this concern would involve both a systematic analysis of whether climate change impacts might be expected in the targeted area, whether their severity could (further) threaten the general population's access to vital resources, what groups would be most vulnerable, what kind of adaptation and resilience mechanisms might already be in place and could be encouraged. If climate change were in fact to be considered fully, its possible relationships to available civil and military assets, as well as its ties to other types of interventions, including humanitarian assistance, development cooperation or diplomacy, would need to be considered: Table 2 provides an overview of the available 'repertories'.
In October 2012 the European Parliament issues a resolution "The Role of the CSDP in case of climate driven crises and natural disasters" calling on the High Representative and the Commission to 'mainstream the potential effects of climate change on security into the most important strategies, policy documents and financial instruments for external action and CSDP; believes that mainstreaming should be the guiding principle, to be pursued in a similar way as human rights and gender http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2012-0349&format=PDF&langu age=EN. In terms of means to be deployed, the EP 'Is of the opinion that civilian and military capabilities should be developed in such a way as to allow their deployment in response to natural disasters and climate-driven crises; believes that special attention should be paid to the development of military capabilities and, in particular, to the process of pooling and sharing; calls for a greater role of the EDA (European Defence Agency) in this matter'. It is interesting to note that a Minority Report by three MEPs voiced concern and stated: 'Although the report is based on the correct assumption that climate change can exacerbate existing conflicts it wrongly focuses on repressive and military counter-measures whilst advocating further EU -militarization'.
'Mainstreaming' climate change into CSDP missions is thus recognised as a goal for the EU and this can enhance the effectiveness of such missions as compared to cases where climate change was not addressed while being possibly relevant. At the same time, such mainstreaming will need to be sensitive to the risk of the ties between climate change impacts, security and peace being manipulated by political, economic or military leaders for other purposes.
Prospects: Three 'Scenarios'
What does the future hold for the relationship(s) between climate change, security and EU and international governance? Without attempting to develop a full-fledged analysis of potential future scenarios it is possible to sketch three tenable basic 'scenarios.' Those are outlined next.
Scenario 1: Greening Security
In this scenario, the link between climate change and security encourages continued EU and international community adoption of the broad notion of security (human security and comprehensive security) by linking environmental, economic and social aspects to analyses of intra-community, inter-state or broader geopolitical tensions and violent conflicts. In this alternative, the '2007 turn' that made such links appear higher on the international policy agenda is consolidated by further natural and humanitarian disasters -some hitting already war-torn or turbulent geopolitical zones.
Such a context offers security actors (armed forces, parts of the intelligence community, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, etc.) previously involved only marginally in climate policies, an opportunity to enhance their legitimacy by contributing to successful management of a global public good. This same set of incentives might also apply to the EU and elicit increased alignment of Union internal and external policies in the guise of www.ccsenet.org/res Review of European Studies Vol. 5, No. 3; 2013 the Common Foreign and Security Policy, at times criticised for evidencing a 'double democratic deficit ' (Born and Hänggi 2004) . The more transparent procedures, stronger parliamentary oversight and public debate that characterise 'civilian' policy formulation and implementation may encourage actors in the security domain to consider more cooperative approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation policies in view of preventing or managing crises and conflicts. As a result, in this scenario, two significant developments occur: at the international level, a new protocol to the FCCC includes a mutual assistance and peace-building clause to foster cooperation in case of disasters and to address collectively violence that may be occurring in an area hit by floods, droughts or hurricanes. In the EU, under this alternative view of the future, analyses of climate change impacts is systematically mainstreamed in all policies, including in the Common Security and Defence Policy, broader peace-building, conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance and human rights policies.
Scenario 2: The War on Climate Change
In this scenario, increased international emphasis on security in relation to climate change leads to the capture by security actors of an issue previously firmly in the civilian sphere. Intelligence services go beyond performing early warning analyses and employ the issue of environmental security to create or increase social alarm over mass migration, hoarding of scarce resources and border conflicts.
In this view of the future, the 'war on climate change' becomes a new label to justify a further tightening of border controls, increased restrictions on asylum and immigration, and/or the launching of preventive wars to obtain or retain access to natural resources. In this scenario, the FCCC is marginalised. The Security Council is called on to consider the new trend, but is divided. Countries and communities now fight over areas where cooperation had been working for decades, as in the Arctic or the Nile Delta. The EU's commitment to multilateralism is put under stress and the Union's celebration of civilian power is seen as irrelevant and abandoned in favour of increased military power.
Scenario 3: Much Ado about Nothing
In this scenario, after a period of renewed attention to climate change, principally as a result of its link popularly to security, the oil lobby together with various energy-intensive industrial lobbies manage to underplay the risk of climate change. The nuclear power sector develops again, after years of stagnation, and is widely viewed as offering a solution to climate change; in this option, the challenges of nuclear waste, major accidents and nuclear proliferation are largely ignored.
International climate-related negotiations remain difficult; the Copenhagen Accord lead to promising, but not-implemented, voluntary commitments, the Durban Platform is not implemented and the successor to the Protocol is not developed. GHG emissions continue to rise, as do the impacts of climate change. The international governance system established with the FCCC and the role of the EU in it become another example of ineffective multilateralism. 
Some Concluding Reflections
The rhetoric of the summary document of the Toronto Conference of 1988 'The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security', was alarming: 'Humanity is conducting an unintentional, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war' (WMO, 1989) .
More than twenty years have passed since climate change and security were linked conceptually, but the international community has thus far not found a way to reduce GHG emissions' globally. In short, as the third scenario posits, the current debate may be quite ephemeral. Alternatively one might contend the 'Toronto alarm' proved quite influential and played a role in encouraging the creation of the IPCC and the start of the negotiations leading to the FCCC. On this view, one might contend that the EU and international community are now embarked on what will prove a self-reinforcing positive path, as suggested in the first scenario. Or one www.ccsenet.org/res Vol. 5, No. 3; 2013 might argue that after the end of the Cold War, conflicts over natural resources and preventive military interventions to tackle tensions aggravated by climate change may represent new opportunities for nations to reconfigure the geopolitical map.
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Further analysis can help to assess the relative plausibility of these three scenarios (and others). What is already known is that GHG emissions are increasing and some climate impacts are already occurring. The international community can move either to address these trends or conclude that no more than 'business as usual' is feasible. Consistent pursuit of the first option might help to prevent catastrophic scenarios of wars exacerbated by climate pressures or of massive displacement of populations who become environmental refugees. The second alternative may instead aggravate the problem in an attempt to 'over-securitise' an issue that needs to be primarily addressed in economic, technological and social terms. The third alternative can also exacerbate the problem by underestimating it and postponing the costs associated with addressing it to a time when such costs will be even higher.
The implications for the EU as peace and security actor seem quite clear. By leading on international climate change policies, the EU has already, albeit implicitly, been seeking ways and means by which to address its peace and security implications. By adding an explicit 'mainstreaming' of the analysis of when and how climate change may be a threat multiplier, the Union can further enhance its standing while ensuring that all necessary means to address the challenge are considered when it embarks on crisis management and peace-building missions. At the same time, such mainstreaming needs to be seen in the context of the broader effort to combat climate change in the context of the FCCC rather than 'capturing' the climate agenda for other purposes; it can do so by adding crisis management capability to the economic, social, technological, institutional instruments developed at national, regional and international levels.
